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Introduction 
Healthcare ethics consultation (HCEC) has reached a critical moment in 
its history. HCEC aims to help patients and healthcare providers identify, 
navigate, and resolve ethical questions, conflicts, and concerns as they arise in 
the clinical setting. Nearly 81% of hospitals overall and 100% of hospitals over 
400 beds offer HCEC services. 1 Despite the prevalence and importance of 
HCEC, healthcare ethics (HCE) consultants currently have no standardized 
training requirements or educational standards. However, the HCEC community 
has built momentum to better define the role of HCE consultants, to develop 
standardized approaches to HCEC, and to establish educational standards for 
training future HCE consultants. These efforts have culminated in plans to role 
out a trial accreditation system within the next year. 2 As Jeffery Spike writes, “the 
year 2013 may someday be seen as the year a new profession was born.” 2 (p20) 
In order to develop accreditation and education standards for future HCE 
consultants, it is critical to identify the best approach to HCEC. Identifying the 
best approach to HCEC includes defining the goals of HCEC and establishing 
approaches and strategies that meet these goals. 
Once the optimal approach to HCEC is established, educators must define 
the skill and knowledge bases necessary to implement that approach. There is 
general agreement that well-trained HCE possess unique expertise. However, 
accreditation requires precisely defining which skills and knowledge bases are 
required. Only after precisely defining the composition of the expertise required 
	   2	  
of competent HCE consultants can educational and assessment strategies be 
established. 
When trying to identify the best approach to HCEC and the composition of 
HCEC expertise, broader theoretical questions emerge. Many of these questions 
pertain to moral epistemology: questions about the nature, scope, and 
justification of moral knowledge. What does moral knowledge look like, and how 
is moral knowledge obtained? What assumptions do we hold, both implicitly and 
explicitly, about the nature of morality, and are those assumptions valid? 
These tacit assumptions held about the nature of morality influences the 
way consultants approach HCEC. Kathrin Ohnsorge and Guy Widdershoven 
argue that “the way we approach clinical ethical problems in practice…depend[s] 
on the epistemological and anthropological premises from which we start.” 3 They 
note that “these presuppositions are not specific bioethical theories, but basic 
assumptions which inform the way in which we see the world and act in it.” 3 
Ohnsorge and Widdershoven articulate their stance on the importance of seeking 
an accurate moral epistemology with clarity:  
We believe that the presuppositions of the way of working in [HCEC] are 
more important than the theories used; these presuppositions lead to 
different ways of using theories, based on different epistemological and 
anthropological grounds – leading to different results. 3  
 
Because our tacit assumptions about the nature of morality influence the way we 
practice, and thus the results of our practice, HCEC would benefit from the 
pursuit of an accurately reflection of how people experience morality in real 
space and time.  
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With the hopes of guiding the future development of HCEC, this paper 
attempts to better understand the nature of morality by integrating moral 
psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s theory of human functioning in moral contexts with 
Margaret Urban Walker’s work in moral philosophy. First, I present Margaret 
Urban Walker’s two contrasting philosophical views of morality: the theoretical-
juridical model (TJM) of morality and the expressive-collaborative model (ECM) 
of morality. The TJM describes morality as an attempt to approximate a timeless, 
universal moral reality into rationally codifiable laws, procedures, or principles to 
guide individual behavior. Conversely, the ECM describes morality as a human 
social phenomenon that arises out of ongoing negotiations between people over 
their responsibilities. I will then argue that evidence from moral psychology might 
contribute to this philosophical debate. 
Second, I present evidence suggesting that traditional models of how 
people make moral judgments overestimate the causal role of reasoning and 
underestimate the causal role of emotions. I then briefly summarize several 
domains of research that must be included in a comprehensive model of moral 
judgment, including research in from affective processing, automaticity, 
neuroscience, evolutionary theory, cultural psychology, and primatology. Based 
on this research, I argue that a comprehensive model of moral judgment should 
1) reconsider the traditionally held relationship between moral intuitions and 
moral reasoning, and 2) explicitly recognize that moral judgment is an ongoing 
social phenomenon arising in response to the evolutionary challenges of 
managing social life. 
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Third, I present a model of moral judgment that I believe meets these two 
criteria: Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model (SIM) of moral judgment. The 
first major claim of the SIM is that an individual’s initial moral judgments appear 
suddenly and automatically in consciousness without deliberately having 
searched, weighed evidence, or inferred a conclusion. These moral intuitions are 
then followed by post hoc moral reasoning, or the conscious search for 
supporting evidence. The second major claim is that moral judgment is an 
ongoing social process that occurs over time and between multiple people. Then, 
returning to Margaret Urban Walker’s work on the nature, source, and 
justification of moral knowledge, I argue that the SIM supports the validity of the 
ECM for two reasons. First, the fact that individual moral judgments are not made 
by rationally applying moral theories to specific cases undermines a central 
tenant of the TJM. Furthermore, the ECM recognizes that moral judgment is an 
ongoing social phenomenon arising out of the challenges inherent to social life.  
Finally, I discuss how the SIM can be applied to HCEC to guide practice. I 
will present three approaches to HCEC that have described in the literature: 1) 
the authoritarian approach, 2) the pure consensus approach, and 3) the ethics 
facilitation approach. Using the SIM as a framework for the discussion, I argue 
that the authoritarian approach is prone to biased moral judgments, and therefore 
should be rejected, but that the pure consensus and ethics facilitation 
approaches are both compatible with the SIM. Both approaches require 
consultants to facilitate a moral discussion by mediating the interpersonal links in 
the SIM. However, the ethics facilitation approach also allows consultants to 
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share their own moral intuitions, judgments, and reasoning in the discussion. The 
ethics facilitation approach therefore implies that HCE consultants have some 
sort of expertise that warrants the sharing of their intuitions, judgments, and 
reasoning. I argue that if this expertise truly exists, it would present itself as 
nuanced moral intuitions that are developed through clinical experience, rather 
than through an ability to better deduce what ought to be done. In the concluding 
chapter, I discuss how this might influence how HCE consultants are trained and 
accredited. 
Overall, this paper should be seen as the start of a new discussion rather 
than an answer to an old one. Certainly, the claims made by Walker and Haidt 
are bold and subject to ongoing debate. I, however, find their views convincing. 
Furthermore, to my knowledge, there have been no attempts in the HCEC 
literature to ground the practice of HCEC in a psychological model of how people 
make moral judgments. I firmly believe that understanding how people make 
moral judgments, and where consultants fit into that process, is centrally 
important to HCEC. Our views of how people make moral judgments changes 
how HCE consultants practice and are trained and educated, and is of primary 
importance for this nascent profession.   
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Chapter 1 
In this chapter, I summarize the work of Margaret Urban Walker, who 
presents two contrasting views of the nature, source, and justification of moral 
knowledge: the theoretical-juridical model (TJM) of morality and the expressive-
collaborative model (ECM) of morality. These two views differ fundamentally, and 
it would be useful to determine which model more accurately represents the 
nature of morality. After describing Walker’s two models, I argue that a synthesis 
of relevant research from fields outside of moral philosophy may advance this 
ongoing philosophical debate.  
The Theoretical-Juridical Model of Morality 
In Margaret Urban Walker’s book Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study 
in Ethics, 4 Walker addresses the question of the nature, source, and justification 
of moral knowledge. Her project challenges common philosophical views about 
“what moral knowledge is like, where to look for it, and how to tell when you’ve 
found some.” 4 (p4)  
Walker begins her study of moral epistemology by describing the 
prevailing view of morality in moral philosophy, which she calls the theoretical-
juridical model (TJM). The TJM is not a moral theory itself, but a framework of 
morality and moral inquiry that has prevailed in Western philosophy since the 20th 
century. The TJM “prescribes morality as a compact, propositionally codifiable, 
impersonally action-guiding code within an agent, or as a set of law-like 
propositions that ‘explain’ the moral behavior of a well-formed moral agent…by 
‘explaining’ what should happen.” 4 (p7-8) As Walker states, “many utilitarian, 
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contract, neo-Kantian, or rights-based theories that are otherwise diverse and 
contradict each other can be seen to realize or approximate the theoretical-
juridical model.” 4 (p7) 
The TJM implies the existence of a timeless, universal moral reality that 
transcends human experience. Walker argues that the TJM considers 
philosophical reflection on morality as “not ‘merely’ reflecting on [one’s] own 
moral experience.” 4 (p5) Instead, the TJM suggests that philosophical reflection 
“[taps] into a moral reality, or the moral realm, or the structure of practical reason, 
or the nature of the right and the good.” 4 (p5) Inherent to this view of philosophical 
reflection is the assumption “that the moral reality, realm, nature, or structure is 
something accessible and determinate quite apart from anyone’s acquired 
experience.” 4 (p5) 
The TJM sees moral theories as attempts to approximate moral reality into 
codifiable laws, procedures, or principles to guide individual behavior. As Walker 
describes, “moral theories try to ‘represent’ the ideal capacity of the well-
equipped moral agent…in a codifiable, compact, consistent set of procedures for 
generating or justifying action-guiding judgments.” 4 (p36-37) The central aim of 
moral philosophy, therefore, relates to the “discovery/construction, testing, 
comparison, and refinement of moral theories.” 4 (p37) The construction and 
revision of moral theories aims to better “exhibit the essential core of pure or 
proper moral knowledge,” 4 (p37) therefore yielding optimal moral judgments to 
guide individual behavior. 
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In this way, the TJM represents morality as the pursuit of a kind of formal 
knowledge. As Walker writes: 
[The TJM] demotes a great deal of what is known, felt, and acted out in 
moral relations to “nonmoral” – merely factual or collateral – information. 
It shrinks morality “proper” down to a kind of purified core of purely moral 
knowledge. 4 (p8) 
 
Factual information about social arrangements, conventions, or expectations is 
minimized. Instead, the TJM views morality as the pursuit of a purified core of 
moral knowledge, which is obtainable through reason and codified into moral 
theories. In this way, moral knowledge manifests itself as knowledge of moral 
theories, how to reason using them, and how to apply them to specific cases. 
The Expressive-Collaborative Model of Morality 
Walker challenges the accuracy of the TJM. She proposes an alternative 
view quite distinct from the TJM, which she calls the expressive-collaborative 
model (ECM). The ECM views morality as “a socially embodied medium of 
mutual understandings and negotiation between people over their responsibility 
for things open to human care and response.” 4 (p9) Central to the ECM, and in 
contrast to the TJM, morality does not transcend human experience. Instead, 
morality is embedded in social practices; it is generated and sustained by 
everyday social life, arising out of and reproduced or modified by interactions 
between people. 
Walker proposes four hypotheses about morality related to the ECM. First, 
she hypothesizes that morality consists in practices, not theories. Walker does 
not mean to suggest that theories about morality are unnecessary or 
meaningless. Rather, she reiterates that “theories of morality should not be 
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confused with morality [itself], the human social phenomenon the theories are 
about.” 4 (p15) Under the ECM, “theories of morality are attempts to find out what 
people are doing in bringing moral evaluation to bear…on what they and others 
do and care about, and whether some ways…are better ways than others.” 4 (p15) 
If morality consists of social practices and not moral theories, then theories of 
morality should be attempts to understand those important social practices. 
Second, Walker hypothesizes that practices characteristic of morality are 
practices of responsibility. She maintains that practices of responsibility 
“implement commonly shared understandings about who gets to do what to 
whom and who is supposed to do what for whom.” 4 (p16) These practices of 
responsibility define who we are and what we can do, affirm what is important 
and what we care about, and designate who has the authority to judge us. 
Therefore, moral accountability is not independent of social assignments of 
responsibility. Rather, moral accountability arises out of the ongoing assignment, 
acceptance, and deflection of responsibilities between people. 
Walker’s third hypothesis holds that morality is not socially modular. Here 
Walker argues that moral life is indistinct from social life. People’s social 
positions and identities define to whom and for what they are morally 
accountable. Therefore, people from different social positions (e.g., social 
classes, cultural backgrounds, generations, etc.) will understand the moral-social 
world differently as a matter of course. Divergences in moral judgments about a 
given situation or issue can be interpreted as differences in moral identities and 
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positions, rather than as differences in how people apply moral theories, as the 
TJM would suggest. 
Fourth, Walker hypothesizes that the search for a pure core of moral 
knowledge, or the emphasis on the construction and application of moral 
theories, makes vast swaths of “people’s moral lives disappear or render[s] 
[them] unintelligible.” 4 (p18) Morality pertains to actual people in real human social 
spaces who assign, accept, and deflect responsibilities in ongoing, real time 
negotiations. The search for ideal, pure moral knowledge characteristic of the 
TJM ignores the fact that moral-social worlds vary significantly between people. 
The view that moral knowledge transcends the boundaries of a social world with 
obvious social divisions shields moral theorists from seeing moral knowledge as 
culturally situated. Therefore, the pursuit of a transcendent core of moral 
knowledge negates significant portions of daily life. 
Resolving the Debate: An Appeal for Consilience 
The TJM and ECM endorse vastly different views of what morality is and 
how moral knowledge is obtained. It would be useful in HCEC to identify which of 
the two models more accurately describes what people do. Attempts to resolve 
this debate may benefit from looking to the natural world for answers, asking 
what scientific research suggests seeking about how people make moral 
judgments. E.O. Wilson has long advocated for seeking consilience between the 
sciences and the humanities, which includes moral philosophy. 5-7 Consilience 
refers to “the interlocking of causal explanations across disciplines.” 5 Wilson 
demonstrates how in the natural sciences, the “webwork of established cause 
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and effect…is almost continuous from quantum physics to biogeography.” 5 
Chemistry and physics, which were once considered disparate fields, form a 
unified continuum explaining physical phenomena on a scale ranging from 
subatomic particles to the motions of the galaxies. This continuum undergirds 
molecular chemistry, which has strong causal links to cellular, organismic, and 
evolutionary biology. The webwork traverses vast scales of space, time and 
complexity, uniting what appear to be radically different phenomena into a single 
web of knowledge. 
Wilson argues that the humanities are next to be linked to the causal 
webwork. 5-7 Humans are one of many biological species living on Earth, and we 
are not free from the causal relationships that exist in the natural world. In fact, 
as one particular type of organism, we fit right into the continuum as a species 
within organismic biology. The aspects of human nature that are traditionally 
addressed in the humanities are products of the human mind, which can be 
understood in terms of biology, neuroscience, genetics, and evolution. Although 
scientific and literary cultures have traditionally been considered “an 
epistemological discontinuity, a permanent difference in ways of knowing,” 5 the 
idea of connecting science and the humanities into one unified web of knowledge 
is not as farfetched traditionally thought.  
Still, one may argue that drawing on descriptive research from the natural 
sciences of how people actually make moral judgments misses the point of moral 
philosophy. Critics might argue that moral philosophy is prescriptive (i.e., 
determines what ought to be) whereas the sciences are descriptive (i.e., explains 
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what was, is, or will be). Therefore, looking to the sciences to understand how 
people make moral judgments should not inform the philosophical debate 
between the ECM and the TJM, because moral philosophy and the sciences 
address two different questions. 
However, this argument fails after considering the goal of Walker’s project. 
Walker’s project makes no attempt to determine what ought to be. Deciding 
whether the TJM or the ECM better describes morality is a descriptive question. 
She aims to determine what the nature, source, and justification of moral 
knowledge actually is. This is a descriptive question, and therefore certainly 
benefits from appealing to the sciences for answers. Moral philosophy and the 
sciences are integral to each other, and a scientific perspective on the human 
condition can only be illuminating for moral philosophy. 
Summary 
The moral epistemology, or the conception of the nature, scope, and 
justification of moral knowledge, endorsed by HCE consultants steers the 
practice of HCEC. Therefore, an accurate representation of the nature of morality 
is critical. Margaret Urban Walker proposes two contrasting models of morality: 
the TJM and the ECM. The TJM views morality as a compact, codifiable, 
impersonally action-guiding code for an agent, and implies the existence of a 
timeless, universal moral reality that exists independently of human experience. 
Conversely, the ECM views morality as a human social phenomenon comprised 
of ongoing negotiations about responsibilities and accountability between people. 
These two models differ fundamentally, and identifying which model more 
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accurately describes the nature of morality would benefit HCEC. An appeal to 
research from outside of philosophy, integrating science and the humanities, 
would inform this debate over the nature of moral knowledge.   
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Chapter 2 
An accurate portrayal of the nature, source, and justification of moral 
knowledge is paramount in healthcare ethics consultation (HCEC) because it 
influences how consultants approach their practice. In the last chapter, I 
presented two contrasting views of morality based on Margaret Urban Walker’s 
distinction between the theoretical-juridical model (TJM) and the expressive-
collaborative model (ECM). The TJM describes morality as an attempt to access 
some timeless, universal moral truth by developing rationally codifiable laws, 
procedures, or principles to guide individual behavior. Conversely, the ECM 
describes morality as a human social phenomenon that arises out of ongoing 
negotiations between people over their responsibilities. Finally, I argued that 
evidence from the sciences might contribute to this philosophical debate. 
In this chapter, I present evidence that people do not come to their initial 
moral judgments by applying moral theories or through impartial philosophical 
reflection. I then summarize several research domains that have implications for 
a new model of moral judgment, including affective processing, automaticity, 
neuroscience, evolutionary theory, cultural psychology, and primatology. 
Integration across these domains suggests that an accurate model of moral 
judgment should 1) be a dual-process model, with one automatic unconscious 
process and one controlled deliberative process, and 2) explicitly recognize that 
moral judgment is an ongoing social process. 
Do People Make Moral Judgments Based On Reason? 
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As described in Chapter 2, the TJM views people as individual reasoners, 
making moral judgments through the application of general moral theories to 
specific cases. In moral psychology, this focus on the rational application of 
moral theories is consistent with what Jonathan Haidt calls a rationalist model of 
moral judgment (Figure 1). 8 According to Haidt, rationalist models of moral 
judgment hold that reasoning plays the primary causal role. While people 
certainly have emotions that can influence how people reason, these emotions 
do not have a direct effect on moral judgments.   
 
 
Figure 1. Haidt’s rationalist model of moral judgment. 8 Affect can influence reasoning, 
but does not directly influence moral judgments. 
 
Haidt argues that rationalist models ascribe variation in moral judgment to 
differences in how people reason about moral issues. Walker makes similar 
conclusions regarding the TJM, stating that “moral disagreement or diversity 
is...rendered as [an] application of different rational procedures.” 4 According to 
both the TJM and Haidt’s description of rationalist models of moral judgment, 
moral judgments are best understood by investigating how people reason about 
moral issues.  
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However, Haidt and other researchers argue that rationalist models of 
moral judgment underestimate the causal influence of emotions. In fact, Haidt 
argues that automatic emotional intuitions come first when individuals make 
moral judgments, with moral reasoning occurring second in an attempt to build 
supporting arguments. 8 Examples of these lines of research include the moral 
dumbfounding phenomenon, evidence for a direct causal link between emotions 
and moral judgment, neuroimaging studies, and evidence that moral reasoning 
occurs post hoc. 
Importantly, the research presented here does not comprehensively 
review the broad literature on the role of reasoning and emotional intuitions in 
making moral judgments. I aim only to present illustrative examples of the major 
criticisms against rationalist models of moral judgment. 
Moral Dumbfounding 
The first line of research suggesting that emotions have a direct causal 
link to moral judgments is moral dumbfounding. Imagine the following scenario:  
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in 
France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying 
alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting 
and fun if they tried making love. At the very least it would be a new 
experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, 
but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making 
love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a special 
secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you 
think about that? Was it OK for them to make love? 14  
 
Most people who read this story immediately say it is morally wrong for 
these siblings to make love. However, they also have difficulty justifying why. 
Jonathan Haidt and colleagues demonstrated this phenomenon, which they call 
moral dumbfounding, by presenting participants with several tasks, including a 
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dispassionate moral reasoning scenario and two morally dumbfounding 
scenarios. 14 The dispassionate moral reasoning scenario involves a man who 
must decide whether to steal a drug in order to save his dying wife. The two 
morally dumbfounding scenarios include 1) the story about consensual sex 
between two adult siblings above, and 2) a story about cannibalism of a corpse 
donated for research. Participants were asked to make a moral judgment about 
the scenarios, and were told that the investigators would attempt to challenge 
their judgment. After each task, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire 
rating their level of confusion, irritation, confidence in their judgment, and extent 
to which they based their judgment on a “gut feeling.” The series of tasks were 
also video-recorded, coded, and analyzed following completion. 
 Participants were more likely to report making their judgments based on 
“gut reactions” for the morally dumbfounding vignettes compared to the 
dispassionate moral reasoning story. Furthermore, when their arguments were 
challenged, participants were more likely to surrender their initial argument for 
morally dumbfounding stories compared to the dispassionate moral reasoning 
story, but were equally likely to hold on to their initial judgment. Participants were 
also more likely to make unsupported declarations such as, “It is just wrong!” for 
the incest scenario compared to the dispassionate moral task.  
This study demonstrates that certain situations elicit strong emotional 
intuitions about what is right and wrong that cannot be supported by reason, a 
phenomenon known as moral dumbfounding. In morally dumbfounding 
situations, the majority of participants hold on to their initial judgments, even after 
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admitting the fallibility of their justifications. This provides evidence that 
deliberative reasoning does not drive moral judgments to the extent suggested 
by rationalist models. This also provides evidence that emotions have a direct 
causal influence on moral judgments. 
Changing Moral Judgments by Manipulating Moral Emotions 
The direct causal influence of emotions on moral judgment is further 
supported by a series of experiments using posthypnotic suggestion to 
manipulate emotions. 15 In the first experiment, researchers suggested 
hypnotized participants to feel a pang of disgust when they heard a particular 
word, but to have no memory of that suggestion until cued to remember. Half of 
the participants were told to feel disgust from the word “often” and half were 
instructed to feel disgust from the word “take.” The participants were then 
removed from their hypnotic state and given six vignettes that were designed to 
be morally dumbfounding. The six vignettes were written in two forms to include 
either the word “take” or the word “often” without changing the semantics of the 
vignettes. For example, “the Congressman [regularly takes/often accepts] 
bribes.” After reading each vignette, participants rated how morally wrong they 
thought the behavior was. To ensure that the hypnosis was effective, participants 
were also asked if they “would like to take a cookie” from a tray and told that they 
could “take as many as they liked.” 
As predicted, participants who were hypnotized to the “take” condition took 
significantly fewer cookies than those hypnotized to the “often” condition, proving 
that the posthypnotic suggestion was successful. Most importantly, however, the 
	   19	  
behaviors in the vignettes were rated as more immoral when the disgust cue was 
present compared to when the disgust cue was absent. These findings offer 
experimental evidence, rather than just correlational evidence, that manipulating 
emotional predispositions has a direct impact on moral judgments.  
However, it is possible that the lower scores would generalize to any 
rating scale, not just a rating scale about morality. This shortcoming was 
addressed in the second experiment. Participants followed the same protocol, 
except for several important changes. The second experiment included a new 
control story that contained no moral violation. For instance, “Dan is a student 
council representative for his school. When bringing up topics for discussion, he 
[tries to take/often picks] topics that are important to both the students and the 
professors.” The second experiment also included further controls, where 
participants rated how much they would enjoy doing 12 activities. Four of the 
activities contained the word “often,” four contained the word “take,” and four 
contained neither. 
The findings for the second experiment replicated the results of the first: 
participants judged the moral transgressions to be significantly more immoral 
when the disgust cue was present compared to when the disgust cue was 
absent. However, the presence of the disgust cue did not significantly affect the 
enjoyment ratings of the 12 non-transgression-related activities. Furthermore, the 
responses of participants regarding the vignette that did not contain a moral 
transgression suggest that manipulating emotions can actually create a moral 
wrong from scratch. In the absence of a disgust cue, participants rated the event 
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as neither disgusting nor morally wrong at all. However, the presence of the 
disgust cue significantly increased ratings of both disgust and moral wrongness, 
even though there was no moral transgression whatsoever. 
Qualitative reports from the participants further show that emotions play a 
causal role in moral judgments. One participant is quoted as saying, “When 
‘often’ appeared I felt confused in my head, yet there was turmoil in my stomach. 
It was as if something was telling me that there was a problem with the story yet I 
didn’t know why.” Participants’ responses to the story without a moral 
transgression were particularly revealing. Participants often rationalized their 
responses with unjustified attacks on the fictitious character. One participant said 
that the character was a “popularity-seeking snob.” Another wrote, “It just seems 
like he is up to something.” These findings support the view that moral emotions 
play the primary causal role in moral judgment, not moral reasoning as rationalist 
models suggest. 
The Trolley and The Footbridge: an fMRI study 
The important role of emotions in moral judgment is corroborated by 
neurobiological evidence. Greene et al. used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) to measure brain activity in different regions of the brain as 
people made moral judgments. 16 The researchers used two classic moral 
dilemmas in their research: the trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma. 
In the trolley dilemma, a runaway trolley heads down a track that forks in 
two directions. A group of five people are tied down at one end of the track, while 
a single person is tied down at the other end. If the trolley continues on its current 
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track, the group of five will be run over and killed. However, you have the 
opportunity to pull a lever and switch the trolley to the second track, sparing the 
group of five but killing the single person instead. Should you pull the lever to 
switch the trolley, or should you let the trolley continue on its present path? 
The footbridge dilemma is similar to the trolley dilemma in all respects 
except for one important difference. Instead of pulling a lever, you must push an 
innocent man off of a footbridge out in front of the trolley in order to stop it from 
reaching the group of five. The man is the only person large enough to stop the 
trolley. Should you push the man in front of the trolley, sacrificing his life in order 
to save the group of five? 
Interestingly, while people often elect to pull a lever in order to save the 
group of five, few elect to push the large man off of the footbridge. Yet reason 
alone suggests that these dilemmas are equivalent: one life is sacrificed in order 
to save five. If the two outcomes are logically equivalent, what explains the 
differential in responses? 
Greene et al. investigated this very question in a series of fMRI 
experiments. 16 The authors recognized that moral dilemmas differed from more 
trivial dilemmas, such as deciding whether to take the bus or drive to work. 
Furthermore, when comparing the footbridge and trolley dilemmas, they 
recognized that pushing a person in front of a trolley seemed much more 
personal and intimate compared to pulling a lever. Based on these observations, 
the authors categorized a series of dilemmas as moral-personal, moral-
impersonal, or non-moral dilemmas. Moral-personal dilemmas contained intimate 
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moral transgressions, similar to the footbridge dilemma. Moral-impersonal 
dilemmas contained passive and more removed moral transgressions, similar to 
the trolley dilemma. Non-moral dilemmas contained transgressions that held no 
moral weight, such as deciding whether drive to work or take the bus. 
The investigators asked participants to respond to these dilemmas and 
recorded their brain activity in four emotional centers and three reasoning centers 
of the brain. They found that moral dilemmas showed significantly more brain 
activity in emotional centers compared to non-moral dilemmas. Furthermore, 
moral-personal dilemmas showed significantly less brain activity in all three 
reasoning centers compared to moral-impersonal and non-moral dilemmas.  
These findings offer the first neurobiological documentation of emotional 
involvement in making moral judgments. All moral decisions showed greater 
emotional involvement compared to non-moral decisions, suggesting that 
emotions are more intimately involved in moral judgments than normal daily 
decisions. Furthermore, moral judgments in intimate moral dilemmas were made 
using fewer reasoning processes than either impersonal moral dilemmas or non-
moral decisions. This presents strong neurobiological evidence that moral 
judgments are not achieved through purely rational process. 
Moral Reasoning as Strategic Reasoning 
A set of experiments by Liu and Ditto further undermines the notion 
that moral reasoning plays the primary causal role in moral judgments. 17 
According to rationalist models of moral judgment, people aggregate their 
factual beliefs about a moral issue and then use those factual beliefs to 
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make their moral judgments. Moral reasoning can be likened to a judge: 
the evidence is gathered and weighed before a judgment is made. 
However, given the research presented above, the investigators were 
dubious of the rationalist view. The authors hypothesized that factual 
beliefs used in moral reasoning are in fact more often developed post hoc 
to support an initial intuitive moral judgment. 
In their experiments, Liu and Ditto presented participants with four 
real world moral problems: forceful interrogation, condom promotion, stem 
cell research, and capital punishment. The participants were then asked to 
rate the degree to which each issue is right or wrong, and to rate their 
perceived costs and benefits. 
In all four cases, participants who judged the act to be morally 
wrong also believed that the act would yield fewer benefits and higher 
costs. For example, participants who indicated that forceful interrogation 
was morally acceptable also indicated 1) a higher likelihood that the 
interrogation would procure valuable information, and 2) that the prisoner 
would feel less pain when compared to participants who indicated that 
forceful interrogation was immoral. 
This experiment demonstrates a correlation between our moral 
judgments and the perception of the probable outcomes. However, the 
causal direction of this relationship remains unanswered: do factual beliefs 
influence our moral judgments, or do moral judgments influence our 
factual beliefs? 
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The final experiment answers the question of causal direction. 
Participants were presented with the same set of four real world 
scenarios. Following the first battery of testing, half of the participants read 
a pro-capital punishment essay, and half read an anti-capital punishment 
essay. The essays were explicitly written to include no factual information 
about the costs or benefits of capital punishment. After reading the essay, 
participants re-answered the capital punishment questions from the initial 
test. The results showed that the perceived benefits of capital punishment 
significantly increased after reading the pro-capital punishment essay, and 
significantly decreased after reading the anti-capital punishment essay. 
Similarly, the perceived costs of capital punishment significantly increased 
after reading the anti-capital punishment essay, and significantly 
decreased after reading the pro-capital punishment essay. 
The final experiment shows that factual beliefs are influenced by our moral 
judgments. Once we have reached a conclusion regarding the morality of a 
particular act, our perception of the facts related to that act change in order to 
justify that position. Moral reasoning does not utilize facts like a judge, weighing 
all available evidence equally. Moral reasoning instead utilizes facts like a lawyer, 
building a case to support our particular position. 
Requirements of a New Model of Moral Judgment 
 Given the evidence presented above, rationalist models of moral judgment 
give disproportionate weight to moral reasoning, and underestimate the causal 
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role of moral emotions. Below, I summarize several domains of research that 
must be addressed in a more comprehensive model of moral judgment.  
Before presenting this research, it is important to note that the new model 
must be able to account for the years of research on moral reasoning. The 
argument for the integration of moral reasoning research is simple. None of the 
criticisms I have presented above suggest that the empirical findings in the moral 
reasoning literature are invalid, although they may need to be interpreted in a 
new light. I have only suggested that psychological models that focus on moral 
reasoning have overemphasized the importance of reasoning compared to 
emotional intuitions. The evidence presented above suggests that emotions play 
a direct causal role on moral judgments, not that moral reasoning plays no role in 
how people make moral judgments. Any comprehensive model of moral 
judgment must account for both moral emotions and moral reasoning.  
Affective vs. Cognitive Processing 
Affective processing is one area of research critical to understanding how 
moral reasoning and moral emotions relate. Eagly and Chaiken broadly define 
affect as feelings or emotions that people have in relation to an object, person, 
place, concept, etc. 18 This contrasts with cognition, which they broadly define as 
thoughts that people have about an object, person, place, concept, etc. Affect 
primarily pertains to evaluative processing: assigning an emotional valence to a 
stimulus. In contrast, cognition primarily pertains to information processing: 
interpreting and organizing the features and characteristics of the stimulus.  
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Prior to the 1980’s, affect was thought to happen only after substantial 
cognitive processing had occurred. 19 According to this view, sensory information 
is absorbed from the environment and processed, ultimately leading to a mental 
representation of the stimulus. This initial information processing determines the 
characteristics of the sensory information (ex. “John is nice”). Only after this 
mental representation is established can an affective judgment occur. This 
secondary affective judgment evaluates whether or not the characteristics of the 
mental representation are desirable (ex. “I like John”).  
Intuitively, it seems logical that information processing must precede 
affective evaluation. In order to conclude whether something is good or bad, 
don’t we need to first establish what that thing is like? As Robert Zajonc 
summarizes in the introduction of his seminal paper Feeling and Thinking: 
Preferences Need No Inferences, “if we say, for example, that we like John 
because he is intelligent, rich, and compassionate, it follows that we must have 
gained that impression of John’s intelligence, wealth and compassion...before we 
formed an attraction to him.” 19  
However, Zajonc presents evidence that, in fact, affective evaluations can 
occur independently from cognitive processing. 19 He bases his assertion on a 
series of studies showing that people are able to make affective evaluations of 
stimuli without forming a mental representation. In these studies, researchers 
present stimuli either 1) while the participants are distracted with another task, or 
2) for an incredibly short amount of time. The participants are then given a list of 
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stimuli and asked 1) to identify which stimuli are novel and which are familiar, 
and 2) to rate their preferences for each stimuli.  
Across these studies, the participants were unable to accurately identify 
which stimuli were novel and which stimuli were familiar. This confirms that the 
stimulus presentation methodology successfully precluded participants from 
developing a mental representation. However, when the participants were asked 
to rate their preferences for each stimulus, they significantly preferred familiar 
stimuli to novel stimuli. Recall that the contemporary view at that time considered 
a mental representation of a stimulus to be a prerequisite for affective judgments. 
Yet, this evidence suggests that people are able to make affective evaluations of 
stimuli without forming a mental representation. 
Based on these findings, Zajonc hypothesized that affect and cognition 
function as two separate systems, able to work relatively independently of each 
other. He describes how affect evolved long before cognition, and that affect 
played a central role in the evolutionary fitness of species across the animal 
kingdom. As Zajonc states: 
The limbic system that controls emotional reactions was there before we 
evolved language and our present form of thinking. It was there before 
the neocortex, and it occupies a large proportion of the brain mass in 
lower animals. Before we evolved language and our cognitive 
capacities...it was the affective system alone upon which the organism 
relied for its adaptation. 19  
 
He then argues that it would be unlikely for such an ancient processing system 
that played such a critical role to survival to completely lose its autonomy to the 
newer evolved cognitive system. As Zajonc states:  
It is rather more likely that the affective system retained its autonomy, 
relinquishing its exclusive control over behavior slowly and grudgingly. At 
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most, the formerly sovereign affective system may have accepted an 
alliance with the newly evolved system to carry out some adaptive 
functions jointly. These conjectures make a two-system view more 
plausible than one that relegates affect to a secondary role mediated and 
dominated by cognition. 19  
 
The idea that affect and cognition work independently was a radical notion at the 
time. Since then however, this two-system view has become widely endorsed. 
Dual-systems processing extends into other areas of psychological research, 
including research on automaticity. 
Automatic vs. Conscious Processing 
Not only can mental processes be conceptualized as affective or 
cognitive, but mental processes can also be conceptualized conscious or 
automatic. 20 Conscious processes are mental processes that occur under our 
awareness (i.e., we know when these processes are occurring), that are 
intentional (i.e., we these processes purposefully), that are effortful (i.e., these 
processes require mental energy), and that are controllable (i.e., we can stop 
these processes at any time). Automatic processes are mental processes that 
occur effortlessly and without need for conscious guidance. Some automatic 
processes must be initiated by an initial act of will to start the process (ex. 
highway driving on “autopilot”), and others start without an initial act of will (ex. 
visual perception).  
The amount that automatic vs. conscious processing influences our daily 
lives remains hotly debated. In regards to this debate, Bargh and Chartrand 
argue that “most of a person’s everyday life is determined not by their conscious 
intentions and deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into 
motion by features of the environment and that operate outside of conscious 
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awareness and guidance.” 20 (p462) The empirical evidence supporting this claim 
draws on two classes of research: 1) priming studies showing that automatic 
processing influences social behavior, and 2) ego depletion studies showing that 
conscious regulation of behavior is exhausting and can only occur sparingly. 
The first class of research supporting the dominance of automatic 
processing in daily life is priming studies. Priming studies involve unobtrusive 
manipulations in the environment that activate automatic mental processes 
outside the awareness of the participants, influencing subsequent participant 
behavior. In one experiment conducted by Bargh, participants were primed with 
words related either to rudeness (ex. rude, impolite, obnoxious), politeness (ex. 
respect, considerate, polite), or neither (control condition) in an initial language 
task. Meanwhile the researchers began conversing amongst themselves, 
providing an opportunity for participants to interrupt the conversation once they 
had completed the language task. Significantly more “rude” primed participants 
interrupted the conversation (67%) compared to the control condition (38%), 
whereas only 16% of “polite” primed participants interrupted the conversation. 
These findings suggest that automatic processes operating beneath conscious 
awareness have a significant impact on our daily decisions. 
The notion that automatic processes heavily influence behavior is 
particularly salient in regards to unconscious attitudes. A meta-analysis in 2009 
by Greenwald et al. found that unconscious, automatic, evaluative associations 
were predictive of a number of behaviors above and beyond conscious, explicit 
attitudes. 21 These behaviors included consumer and political preferences, 
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substance abuse, and discriminatory behaviors based on race, gender, and 
sexual orientation. In 2013, another meta-analysis by Oswald et al. had similar 
findings, although the effect sizes were smaller compared to Greenwald et al. 22 
An additional review by Burgess et al. showed that unconscious racial biases 
contribute to troubling racial differences in medical care. 23  
The second class of research supporting Bargh’s claim that automatic 
processes dominate our daily life is derived from ego depletion studies. Ego 
depletion studies involve studying the impact of an initial self-control task (ex. 
refraining from eating free candy) on performance in a subsequent self-control 
task presented as an unrelated experiment (ex. persistence on a word search 
task). Across these studies, self-control in the second task is significantly 
depleted when participants undergo the initial self-control task. Based on these 
findings, Bargh argues that it would be impossible to live in our complex world if 
the majority of our processing was deliberate, controlled, conscious decisions. As 
Bargh states, “to consciously and willfully regulate one’s own behavior, 
evaluations, decisions, and emotional states requires considerable effort and is 
relatively slow. Moreover, it appears to require a limited resource that is quickly 
used up, so conscious self-regulatory acts can only occur sparingly and for a 
short time.” 20 (p476) However, automatic processes are “unintended, effortless, 
very fast, and many of them can operate at any given time...continually in gear 
guiding the individual safely through the day.” 20 (p476) The involvement of 
automatic processing, which appears to play a critical role in our everyday 
decisions, must be addressed by any comprehensive model of moral judgment. 
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Neuroscience and Acquired Sociopathy 
 Neuroscientific research on general decision-making suggests that not 
only are emotions and reasoning present as two distinct systems, but also that 
both are necessary for proper functioning. In 1996, Bechara and colleagues 
presented evidence that damage to specific sectors of the prefrontal cortex 
thwarts the ability to evaluate the consequences of future behavior, despite 
retaining normal intellectual understanding of the consequences. 24 The research 
compares the functioning of two groups of participants: neurologic patients with 
damage to vmPFC and normal controls. The patients with damage to the vmPFC 
completed neuropsychological tests to assess intellect and memory. Both groups 
then participated in a card game involving rewards and punishments based on 
their decisions, while researchers recorded skin conductance responses (SCR’s), 
a measure of affective activation. SCRs were measured 1) when a reward was 
presented, 2) when a punishment was presented, and 3) while the participants 
were deliberating about their decisions.  
The results of this study showed that both patients and controls had 
affective reactions to receiving rewards and punishments. However, controls, but 
not patients, generated affective responses during the deliberative process. This 
data suggests that patients with vmPFC damage do not generate anticipatory 
affective responses to imagined future events. It is therefore impossible for these 
patients to evaluate the future consequences of a potential decision, despite 
understanding what those consequences would be. As Damasio writes, “patients 
with damage to the prefrontal region develop a severe impairment in personal 
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and social decision making, in spite of otherwise largely preserved intellectual 
abilities.” 25 The authors loosely term this phenomenon as “acquired sociopathy.” 
Based on these findings, affect clearly plays a critical role decision-making, and 
hyper-rational decision-making without reference to affect would actually be 
catastrophic. 
Dual-process models 
The research presented above can be integrated to form the conception of 
dual-process models. Both Zajonc’s research on affect and Bargh’s research on 
automaticity present evidence that two different processes work simultaneously. 
Both present evidence that the first system (affective processes and automatic 
processes) occur quickly, automatically, and effortlessly. Both also present 
evidence that the second system (cognitive processes and controlled processes) 
occur slowly, controlled, and require mental effort. The research in neuroscience 
suggests that, not only are these two systems present, but also both are 
necessary for proper functioning. 
Dual-process models maintain that two different processes work in parallel 
as a person makes a judgment or solves a problem. 26 The first process is a 
quick, automatic, affective process based on unconscious pattern matching and 
heuristics. The automatic process is older evolutionarily and is common to all 
mammals. The second process is slow, controlled, analytical processing that 
occurs consciously and requires effortful mental activity. The controlled process 
represents a newer evolved function unique to humans, primates, and perhaps 
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other close evolutionary cousins. This deliberative process is not necessarily 
involved in normal decision-making, but can be voluntarily recruited if desired.  
Greene et al. tested a dual-process model of moral judgment by repeating 
their trolley and footbridge dilemma experiment outlined above, but this time 
while measuring the reaction times of the participants. 16 To refresh your memory, 
both dilemmas entail sacrificing the life of one person to save the lives of five 
people. However, the trolley dilemma entails pulling a lever and the footbridge 
dilemma entails pushing a man in front of the train. Greene et al. theorized that in 
the footbridge dilemma, our emotions would tend to compel us to not push the 
man in front of the trolley. Therefore, people who do select to push the man are 
making “emotionally incongruent” responses, requiring substantial controlled 
processing to override their initial affective response. Because controlled 
processing is slow compared to affective processing, the dual-process model 
predicts that it would take longer to arrive at emotionally incongruent responses. 
Therefore, Green et al. hypothesized that participants who made emotionally 
incongruent responses would take significantly longer to make their judgment 
compared to those who made emotionally congruent responses. 
Greene et al. confirmed this hypothesis, showing that participants who 
made emotionally incongruent responses took significantly longer to reach their 
decision compared to participants with emotionally congruent responses. 16 This 
finding suggests that moral judgment does indeed follow a dual-process model, 
where moral judgments are made based on both primary quick, automatic, 
affective processing and secondary slow, deliberative, rational processing. 
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Cultural Psychology 
Cultural psychology is an interdisciplinary field intersecting anthropology, 
psychology, and linguistics. The aim of cultural psychology is to understand how 
cultural differences influence psychological diversity. According to Richard 
Shweder:  
[The goal of cultural psychology] is to understand why so many 
apparently straightforward questions about human psychological 
functioning...have not resulted in a consensus among qualified scientists, 
and why so many generalizations about the psychological functioning of 
one particular population...have not traveled well across sociocultural, 
historical, and institutional fault lines. 27  
 
This central mission, the development of psychological theories that account for 
cultural variance without sacrificing the existence of a universal human nature, is 
perhaps summarized best by the discipline’s slogan: “universalism without 
uniformity.” 
Unfortunately, this task is harder than it may appear. In a seminal paper 
by Joseph Henrich and colleagues, the authors argue that behavioral scientists 
routinely publish broad claims about human psychology based entirely on 
samples drawn from WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic) cultures. 28,29 The authors attribute this to implicit assumptions by 
researchers that either there is little variation across human populations or that 
these participants are fairly representative of the human species. However, 
based on a broad review of results across the behavior sciences, including 
research on moral reasoning, reasoning style, and views of fairness and 
cooperation, the authors conclude that WEIRD cultures are frequent outliers. 
This further supports rigorous attempts to develop psychological models that 
	   35	  
describe our universal human nature while still explaining variability between 
cultures. 
Cultural psychology calls for psychological models to account for cultural 
variation in human psychology without sacrificing the notion that there are 
universal aspects of human nature. Or, as Shweder states, one must “reconcile 
human variety with our common humanity.” 27 Unfortunately, this can be difficult 
to achieve. Grounding a new psychological model of moral judgment in 
evolutionary theory may help avoid this pitfall. 
Evolutionary psychology 
Evolutionary psychology attempts to explain human psychology through 
an evolutionary lens. Given that humans are an evolved biological species, it 
follows that the mental processes that humans use today must have been 
adaptive in our evolutionary past. Morality is a concept that is universal across 
cultures. People all around the world have ideas about right and wrong. Yet, the 
specific ideas about what is moral or immoral vary significantly across and within 
cultures. Combining the goals of cultural psychology (universalism without 
uniformity) and evolutionary psychology (human nature is evolved) allows 
common cultural differences in moral judgments to be conceptualized as different 
approaches to universal evolutionary problems. What evolutionary problem 
present in our daily lives might morality itself aim to address?  
One potential explanation is that morality allows people to manage our 
complex social world. As McGlynn writes, “living in groups involves a balance of 
conflict and cooperation, which is mediated by the costs and benefits associated 
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with living socially. When the benefits of living socially exceed the costs and risks 
of social life, scientists predict that social cooperation will be favored.” 30   
Evolutionary theory describes morality as the social phenomenon whereby 
people balance conflict and cooperation. Morality involves individuals defending 
and justifying their own behavior to others in order to avoid being punished or 
ostracized, maximizing benefits for the individual. Morality involves people 
regulating the behaviors of others, establishing norms and expectations that are 
beneficial for the group. This tension between what is best for the individual and 
what is best for the group, or what Jonathan Haidt calls selfishness and 
groupishness, pervades across human cultures. As Haidt writes: 
Individuals compete with individuals, and that competition rewards 
selfishness, which includes some forms of strategic cooperation (even 
criminals can work together to further their own interests). But at the 
same time, groups compete with groups, and that competition favors 
groups composed of true team players, those who are willing to 
cooperate and work for the good of the group, even when they could do 
better by slacking, cheating, or leaving the group. These two processes 
pushed human nature in different directions and gave us the strange mix 
of selfishness and selflessness that we know today. 31 (p191) 
 
The balance between individual benefits and group benefits presents an 
evolutionary challenge that is universal to all humans, and morality appears to 
arise out of this challenge. 
Primatology 
Primatology provides further evidence that morality arises out of the 
evolutionary challenge of regulating social behavior. Frans de Waal is a 
primatologist interested in social behavior of apes, our closest evolutionary 
cousins. In his book Good Natured, de Waal presents evidence that apes 
possess most, if not all, of the ‘building blocks’ of human morality. 32 These 
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‘building blocks’ were largely emotional capacities pertaining to social life. 
Examples include the emotions that bind individuals into friendships, cohere 
groups into cooperative alliances, and empathy and concern for others, even if 
they are not direct kin. Furthermore, the social structures and hierarchies that 
dominate the social life of apes persist in human life today. There is no reason to 
suspect that we have somehow lost the social-emotional capacities that our 
closest evolutionary cousins exhibit regularly. 
The social brain hypothesis further supports the notion that morality is 
concerned with regulating social life. 33 The social brain hypothesis attempts to 
explain why primates have significantly larger brains relative to body size than all 
other animals. The hypothesis claims that primates require relatively larger brains 
because of the incredibly complex, computationally demanding social worlds in 
which they live. As Gowlett et al. describe, “the need to keep track of the 
dynamically changing world of alliances and friendships that typify primate 
society imposes demands on the animals that are simply not matched in the less 
socially intense societies of other birds and mammals.” 33   
Indeed, more recent analysis supports the validity of the social brain 
hypothesis. Primates are the only order of animal species to have a quantitative 
relationship between social group size and relative brain size. The size of the 
primate social group, and therefore the degree of social complexity, increases in 
lockstep with relative brain size. 33 This relationship is even stronger with respect 
to frontal lobe volume, the region of the brain that is the most recently enlarged 
among primates. Furthermore, not only does the group-size-to-brain-size 
	   38	  
relationship exist when comparing individuals between species, the relationship 
also exists when comparing primates within the same species. Individuals who 
are a part of larger social groups and who possess greater social competencies 
tend to have larger frontal lobes. Interestingly, modern humans are the species 
with the largest social groups and the largest neocortex ratio of all primates, 
suggesting that indeed much of our most recent cognitive advancements pertain 
to dealing with social life. 
Summary 
 In this chapter, I presented evidence that rationalist models of moral 
judgment overestimate the causal role of moral reasoning and underestimate the 
causal role of moral emotions when people make moral judgments. I then 
summarize several domains of research that have implications for a new model 
of moral judgment. These domains include affective processing, automaticity, 
neuroscience, evolutionary theory, cultural psychology, and primatology. 
Integration across these domains draws two major conclusions about a new 
model of moral judgment. First, the new model should be a dual-process model, 
including a fast, automatic, intuitive process and a slow, deliberative, reasoning 
process. Second, the new model should explicitly recognize that morality is a 
social phenomenon that arose from the evolutionary challenge of managing 
social life. In the next chapter, I summarize a psychological model of moral 
judgment that addresses these needs and elaborate on the implications of the 
model for understanding the nature, source, and justification of moral knowledge.  
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Chapter 3 
In the previous chapter, I presented evidence that rationalist models of 
moral judgment overestimate the causal role of reasoning and underestimate the 
causal role of emotions when making moral judgments. I then summarized 
several domains of research that should be addressed by a comprehensive 
model of moral judgment. These domains included affective processing, 
automaticity, neuroscience, evolutionary theory, cultural psychology, and 
primatology. Two rough conclusions were drawn from this research. First, a 
comprehensive model of moral judgment should be a dual-process model, 
including 1) a fast, automatic, intuitive process and 2) a slow, deliberative, 
rational process. Second, models of moral judgment should explicitly recognize 
that morality is an ancient social phenomenon arising from the evolutionary 
challenge of managing social life.  
In this chapter, I present one model that I believe meets these two 
requirements: Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model (SIM) of moral judgment.  
After describing the model and discussing several criticisms and limitations, I 
return to the philosophical debate about the nature, source, and justification of 
moral knowledge presented in Chapter 2. I argue that the SIM is more consistent 
with Margaret Urban Walker’s expressive-collaborative model (ECM) of morality 
than the traditional theoretical-juridical model (TJM). 
The Social Intuitionist Model of Moral Judgment 
In 2001, Jonathan Haidt proposed the social intuitionist model (SIM): a 
psychological model of moral judgment that integrates the research findings 
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summarized in Chapter 2. 8 The model is a dual-process model, and is social in 
nature. The central claim of the SIM is that an individual’s initial moral judgments 
are caused by moral intuitions followed by post hoc moral reasoning. Haidt 
defines moral judgments as “evaluations (good vs. bad) of the actions or 
character of a person that are made in respect to a set of virtues held to be 
obligatory by a culture or subculture.” 8 (p817) Moral intuitions refer to “the sudden 
appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including an affective valence 
(good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having gone 
through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.” 8 (p818) 
Conversely, moral reasoning refers to “conscious mental activity that consists of 
transforming given information about people in order to reach a moral judgment.” 
8 (p818) The SIM holds that people are more likely to use moral reasoning to justify 
their initial positions and persuade others to endorse their views, rather than to 
weigh arguments and evidence impartially. 
The model consists of 6 six links that form a moral network (Figure 2): 1) 
the intuitive judgment link, 2) the post hoc reasoning link, 3) the reasoned 
persuasion link, 4) the social persuasion link, 5) the reasoned judgment link, and 
6) the private reflection link. The first four links represent the primary processes 
in moral judgment, and are summarized below: 
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Figure 2. Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral judgment. 8 The numbered links are 1) 
the intuitive judgment link, 2) the post hoc reasoning link, 3) the reasoned persuasion 
link, 4) the social persuasion link, 5) the reasoned judgment link, and 6) the private 
reflection link. Links 5 and 6 occur less frequently and only under certain conditions. 
 
1) The intuitive judgment link: The first link is the intuitive judgment link. 
This link represents the appearance of an initial moral judgment based on 
automatic, effortless intuitions. An eliciting situation triggers a moral intuition (gut 
reaction) with a positive or negative affective valence. This moral intuition forms 
the initial moral judgment that the individual holds. This judgment is established 
quickly, automatically, and without conscious deliberation. 
2) The post hoc reasoning link: The second link is the post hoc reasoning 
link. This link represents the conscious, deliberate development of arguments 
through moral reasoning in support of the previously established moral judgment. 
This link integrates the bulk of the existing research on moral reasoning. Moral 
arguments vary in their complexity and sophistication, ranging from solely 
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considering personal gain to principled ethical appeals. Furthermore, people vary 
in the types of arguments that they use, and can learn to increase the 
sophistication of their arguments. However, the SIM interprets the causal 
direction of moral reasoning differently. The SIM holds that moral reasoning does 
not directly drive moral judgments. Rather, moral arguments are more often 
developed post hoc in defense of previously established positions. People are 
more likely to reason about moral issues like lawyers defending a case, not 
scientists weighing the evidence. 
3) The reasoned persuasion link: The third link is the reasoned persuasion 
link. This link represents the verbalization and explanation of post hoc arguments 
to others with the goal of justifying one’s initial moral judgment or to persuade 
others to agree. The arguments developed through moral reasoning are 
expressed to other people through this link. The specific goals of reasoned 
persuasion vary, but include recruiting support from others, vindicating oneself 
for previous behavior, or defending the actions of a friend or loved one. The 
general goal of reasoned persuasion, however, remains constant: persuade 
others to adopt or accept compatible moral views. 
4) The social persuasion link: The fourth link is the social persuasion link. 
This link represents the direct effect that one’s moral judgments have on the 
moral intuitions of others, independently of whether or not reasoned persuasion 
is used. For instance, the mere fact that a respected individual (ex. spouse, 
parents, clergy, friend, etc.) opposes capital punishment might negatively 
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influence one’s own moral intuitions (and therefore moral judgments) about the 
issue.  
 The last two links are hypothesized to occur, but only rarely and in 
particular circumstances. These links are described below: 
5) The reasoned judgment link: The fifth link is the reasoned judgment 
link. This link represents a moral judgment that is achieved through sheer force 
of logic. Through this link, moral reasoning can be the causal force behind a 
moral judgment. However, the model hypothesizes this to be rare. This link likely 
only occurs when moral intuitions are weak and processing capacity is high, such 
as during “armchair ethics” where the reasoner is emotionally distant from the 
moral issue. 
6) The private reflection link: The sixth link is the private reflection link. 
This represents when private reflection trips new moral intuitions that in turn 
influence moral judgments. The inner dialogue of private reflection allows people 
to take different perspectives or consider new aspects of the issue. Taking new 
perspectives or considering new aspects of the moral issue might trip new moral 
intuitions, thus altering their moral judgments.  
The SIM provides a framework for discussing how people actually make 
moral judgments. Haidt writes that “if the [SIM] is correct as a description of 
human moral judgment, it may be possible to use the model to get reasoning and 
intuition working more effectively together in real moral judgments.” 8 For 
example, promoting the interpersonal links in the SIM allows for biases in our 
individual strategic reasoning to be exposed. As Haidt argues: 
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By seeking out discourse partners…people can help trigger a variety of 
conflicting intuitions in each other. If more conflicting intuitions are 
triggered, the final judgment is likely to be more nuanced and ultimately 
more reasonable. 8  
 
Another approach would be to teach moral reasoning skills. While the SIM 
suggests that this approach may be less effective, it would promote the use of 
reasoned judgment and private reflection (Links 5 and 6). A final approach, which 
the SIM suggests would likely be more effective, would be to create 
environments and cultures that foster moral discussion through reasoned 
persuasion (Link 3) and private reflection (Link 6). 
Limitations and Criticisms of the SIM 
Several researchers have levied criticisms of the SIM since its inception. 
34-36 For example, Saltzstein and Kasachkoff question Haidt’s reasons for 
rejecting traditional views of the role of reasoning in making moral judgments. 34 
First, they argue that the SIM is not truly a dual-process model. 34 The authors 
argue that according to the SIM, “automatic processing appears to be sovereign 
in the making of moral judgments, with reasoning relegated to a secondary role 
that is only artificially called forth…Rather than assign moral reasoning a dual 
role in moral cognition, [Haidt] appears to relegate it to the status of an 
epiphenomenon.” 34 Second, Saltzstein and Kasachkoff doubt Haidt’s claim 
regarding the role of moral reasoning, which they describe as the view that 
“reasoning plays no substantive role in decision making but is employed merely 
as a post hoc justification of decisions that are adopted independently of the 
reasons subsequently offered.” 34   
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Pizarro and Bloom advance a similar criticism of the SIM. 35 They argue 
that there are additional ways that reasoning can influence moral judgments 
beyond what Haidt proposes in the SIM. They present two examples: 1) the 
influence of prior cognitive appraisals (the same situation can elicit different 
moral intuitions depending on the individual’s previous thoughts) and 2) 
conscious control over the situation (people can choose which situations they 
expose themselves to, and which aspects of a particular situation they attend to). 
They argue that these processes challenge “Haidt’s general conclusions about 
the irrelevance of deliberative reasoning, as they raise the possibility that 
deliberative reasoning can affect judgment, albeit in an indirect fashion.” 35 (p195) 
However, these three criticisms seem to misunderstand the conclusions 
that Haidt puts forward with the SIM. Namely, these criticisms overstate the 
extent to which Haidt minimizes the role of deliberative reasoning. Four of the six 
links in the model pertain to moral reasoning, and two of those links are 
deliberative (Links 5 and 6). While Links 5 and 6, the reasoned judgment link and 
private reflection link, are hypothesized to be rare, these links do allow moral 
reasoning to indirectly influence moral judgments. Furthermore, Link 3, the 
reasoned persuasion link, says that people’s moral reasoning can have causal 
effects on the intuitions of others. As Haidt writes in his original article:  
Moral judgment is not just a single act that occurs in a single person’s 
mind but is an ongoing process, often spread out over time and over 
multiple people. Reasons and arguments can circulate and affect people, 
even if individuals rarely engage in private moral reasoning for 
themselves. 8   
 
The SIM does not relegate moral reasoning as an epiphenomenon or endorse 
the view that deliberative reasoning is irrelevant. Moral reasoning does have 
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causal effects on moral judgments, just not the direct causal role that has been 
traditionally endorsed.  
Another criticism levied by Saltzstein and Kasachkoff pertains to Haidt’s 
claims about people’s motivations when they use moral reasoning. Cordelia Fine 
raises similar concerns in her critique of the SIM, and I believe articulates the 
argument more eloquently. 36 Fine notes how the SIM implies that reasoning is so 
biased toward supporting or justifying one’s initial conclusion that it is unlikely to 
play a questioning role in our moral judgments. Haidt bases this claim on 
evidence from two forms of motivated reasoning: impression motivation (the 
desire to create a good impression to others), and defense motivation (the desire 
to hold attitudes and beliefs that are consistent with one’s self concept). Both of 
these forms of motivated reasoning are prone to the biased search for evidence. 
However, Fine argues that Haidt ignores a third form of motivated reasoning: 
accuracy motivation (the desire to hold objectively true beliefs and attitudes). As 
Fine argues, “where the individual is motivated to form accurate judgments, and 
has the attentional resources available to do so, automatic intuitions can be over-
ridden.” 36  
While Haidt indeed does not explicitly address the influence of accuracy 
motivation on reasoning, it can be inferred how accuracy motivation could be 
integrated into the SIM. Increased motivation to be accurate along with available 
attentional resources would be increase the likelihood that an individual would 
use Links 5 and 6, the reasoned judgment link and private reflection link. The 
question of how often people use each of the three forms of motivated reasoning 
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is an interesting one. Perhaps more interesting, however, would be to identify 
which factors attenuate impression motivated and defensive motivated reasoning 
and promote accuracy motivated reasoning. These factors could be used to set 
up environments that promote more deliberative moral judgments, and attenuate 
the biased search for evidence. 
As two further limitations of the SIM, Fine points out two interesting 
phenomena that the SIM does not address. 36 She presents compelling evidence 
that moral intuitions can be interrupted and moderated by conscious deliberative 
processing, albeit only in certain situations (where motivation to be accurate is 
high and cognitive resources are available). She also provides evidence from 
research on automaticity suggesting that conscious deliberative processes (such 
as Links 5 and 6 in the SIM) can be “automatized” over time after repeated 
intentional use. This suggests that, with practice, people can learn to use Links 5 
and 6 automatically. While these represent two legitimate limitations to the SIM, 
they do not undermine its validity outright. Future attempts to modify the SIM 
should take these limitations into account. 
One final debate surrounding the SIM pertains to how moral intuitions are 
formed. In a newer related theory, Jonathan Haidt and colleagues propose that 
moral intuitions are evolved predispositions that have arisen in response to 
evolutionary pressures related to social life. 31,37-39 These intuitions then develop 
throughout one’s life span through the weakening of some intuitions and 
strengthening of other intuitions based on the interaction between genes, culture, 
and the environment. These claims are contentious, and there are legitimate 
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criticisms of Haidt’s view that moral intuitions are based on evolved 
predispositions. 37-40 For example, one alternative explanation of moral intuitions 
would be that they are learned through socialization and become intuitive over 
time, similar to how riding a bike becomes “automatic” with practice.  
Both general accounts of how moral intuitions are formed are plausible, 
and they are both likely to be true to some extent. Importantly, however, this 
debate over how moral intuitions are formed does not undermine the validity of 
the SIM. The central claim of the SIM is that an individual’s initial moral 
judgments are caused by moral intuitions followed by post hoc moral reasoning. 
The claim that an individual’s initial moral judgments are caused by moral 
intuitions stands independently of how those intuitions originate and how they 
change over time. 
The SIM and Moral Epistemology 
Now that the SIM and the research that supports it have been presented, 
it is worth circling back to the debate between the two competing philosophical 
views of morality: the TJM and the ECM. To review, the TJM assumes the 
existence of timeless moral truths that exists independently from human 
experience. Moral theories approximate these moral truths into codifiable laws, 
procedures, or principles. Individuals then use reason to apply these theories to 
specific cases, producing a moral judgment to guide their behavior. Diversity in 
moral judgments, therefore, comes from differences in how people use moral 
theories and reason about the specific case. 
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Conversely, the ECM assumes that morality is a human social 
phenomenon comprised of ongoing, real-time negotiations about responsibilities 
and accountability between people. Moral theories attempt to 1) understand the 
social practices that define to whom we are accountable and for what we are 
accountable, and 2) determine whether some social practices may be better than 
others. Morality does not transcend culture, because people’s actual social 
positions and identities are what define accountability and responsibility. 
Divergences in moral judgments therefore can be understood as differences in 
moral identities and positions, rather than differences in how people apply moral 
theories. 
The SIM and its supporting research suggest that the ECM represents the 
nature of morality more accurately than the TJM in two main important ways. 
First, the TJM falsely maintains that moral judgments are made primarily through 
the application of moral theories. The SIM holds that people more often make 
moral judgments based on fast, effortless, automatic moral intuitions, and then 
use strategic reasoning to search for evidence and build arguments that support 
their initial judgment. Moral dumbfounding occurs in situations where people 
have strong moral intuitions, but have difficulty developing a rational justification 
for those intuitions. Furthermore, people’s moral judgments change as their 
emotional intuitions change, along with their beliefs about pertinent factual 
information. The concept that moral reasoning does not play the primary causal 
role in moral judgments is consistent with research trends in affective evaluation, 
automaticity, dual-process models, and neuroscience.  
	   50	  
Second, the ECM correctly maintains that morality is a social phenomenon 
involving ongoing negotiations about what is right and wrong. The SIM maintains 
that moral judgments are not single acts that occur in one person’s mind. Rather, 
moral judgment is an ongoing process spread out over time and over multiple 
people, as they attempt to justify their positions and persuade each other to 
agree about what is right and wrong. Importantly, neither the SIM nor the ECM 
renders moral reasoning obsolete. Although moral reasoning does not play the 
primary causal role in how individuals make moral judgments, moral reasoning 
does play a primary role in how people negotiate, justify, and persuade. 
Research in evolutionary psychology and primatology suggest that morality 
arises in response to the evolutionary challenges of social life, which creates a 
tension between what is beneficial to the individual and what is beneficial to the 
group. Research in cultural psychology suggests that moral diversity arises from 
unique approaches to deal with these common challenges. 
Taken together, morality appears to be most consistent with the ECM. The 
research suggesting that moral reasoning does not play the primary causal role 
in individual moral judgments undermines the notion that rationally applying 
moral theories to specific cases taps into a timeless moral reality, which is a 
central claim of the TJM. Furthermore, the research suggesting that morality is 
embedded in social life involving ongoing negotiation between people is 
consistent with the primary tenants of the ECM. Morality does not represent 
some abstract, timeless ideal that exists independently of human experience. 
Instead, morality is a human social phenomenon that arises out of social life as 
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people justify their views and attempt to persuade others to agree about what 
ought to be done. 
Summary 
 A comprehensive psychological model of moral judgment should 1) be a 
dual-process model, and 2) emphasize the social aspects of morality. The SIM 
meets these two requirements. The first major claim of the SIM is that an 
individual’s initial moral judgments are more likely to be caused by moral 
intuitions followed by post hoc moral reasoning. The second major claim is that 
moral judgment is an ongoing social process. People form moral networks, 
where they express their judgments and use their moral reasoning to attempt to 
justify their positions and persuade others to endorse their views through multiple 
iterations.  
Returning to Margaret Urban Walker’s work on the nature, source, and 
justification of moral knowledge, the SIM suggests that the ECM more accurately 
describes the nature of morality then the TJM. The fact that an individual’s moral 
judgments are not likely to be made by rationally applying moral theories to 
specific cases undermines a central tenant of the TJM. Furthermore, the ECM 
recognizes that morality is an ongoing social phenomenon arising out of the 
challenges inherent to social life. The next chapter applies the SIM to the 
healthcare ethics consultation (HCEC) setting, better defining the best approach 
to HCEC as well as the role of the consultant.  
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Chapter 4 
To this point, I have argued that the accurate portrayal of the nature, 
source, and justification of moral knowledge is paramount in healthcare ethics 
consultation (HCEC). I presented two contrasting views of morality based on 
Margaret Urban Walker’s distinction between the theoretical-juridical model 
(TJM) and the expressive-collaborative model (ECM). I argued that evidence 
from fields outside of philosophy might contribute to this philosophical debate, as 
well as improve consilience between the sciences and the humanities. 
Next, I presented evidence that moral judgments are more likely to be 
driven by moral intuitions about what is right or wrong, with moral reasoning 
occurring post hoc in an attempt to justify the initial judgment. Furthermore, I 
presented evidence that morality is a natural phenomenon that is seen in 
rudimentary forms throughout the animal kingdom, and arises in response to the 
evolutionary challenges of social life. I also overviewed the social intuitionist 
model (SIM), which supports a view of morality similar to the ECM, rather than 
the prevailing view of morality characterized by the TJM. 
In this chapter, I discuss how the SIM influences our understanding of 
HCEC. I describe several approaches to HCEC, and then apply the SIM to each 
approach in order to understand their implications for HCEC. Finally, I suggest 
that HCE expertise may manifest itself as nuanced moral intuitions, able to detect 
subtle gradations between cases that may otherwise go unnoticed. These 
intuitions likely develop over time, through extensive clinical experience with 
morally challenging cases. 
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Healthcare Ethics Consultation: Which Approach is Best? 
The majority of hospitals in the United States offer healthcare ethics 
consultation (HCEC) services to help resolve ethical questions or concerns that 
arise in clinical settings. HCEC is defined as “a set of services provided by an 
individual or group in response to questions from…involved parties who seek to 
resolve uncertainty or conflict regarding value-laden concerns that emerge in 
health care.” 1,2 The general goal of HCEC is to improve healthcare quality by 
identifying, analyzing, and resolving ethical questions or concerns.  
Recently, the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) 
published the second edition of its report Core Competencies for Healthcare 
Ethics Consultation. 1 The basis of the report rests on the assertion that HCEC 
done well by competent consultants benefits the involved parties, and HCEC 
done poorly by unqualified consultants either fails to benefit or harms the 
involved parties. In the report, the authors consider several approaches to 
HCEC. 
Most approaches to HCEC fall somewhere between two extremes: the 
authoritarian approach and the pure consensus approach. The defining 
characteristic of the authoritarian approach is its emphasis on consultants as 
authoritative moral decision makers. 2,3 In the authoritarian approach, consultants 
begin by gathering all the relevant information about the case, including the 
factual, conceptual, and normative issues. Consultants then apply their 
understanding of bioethical theory, laws, and policies to the case and present a 
final moral judgment. Consultants shoulder responsibility for moral judgments 
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based on their understanding of relevant bioethical, medical, and scholarly 
literature, as well as pertinent laws, institutional policies, and current practice 
standards. 
Conversely, the aim of the pure consensus approach is solely to 
develop consensus among the involved parties. 2,3 In the pure consensus 
approach, consultants only mediate a discussion about the conflict, trying 
to develop a course of action that the involved parties all agree to. In 
contrast to the authoritarian approach, the consultant does not consider 
how the consensus decision relates to bioethical theory, laws, policies, or 
practice standards. The consultant solely seeks consensus, whatever the 
resolution may be. 
The task force recommends an approach that falls somewhere between 
these two extremes, which they call the ethics facilitation approach. 1-3 The ethics 
facilitation approach aims to complete two core tasks: (1) to identify and analyze 
the nature of the value uncertainty; and (2) to facilitate the building of a 
“principled ethical resolution.” 2,4 Unlike the authoritarian approach, ethics 
facilitation emphasizes an inclusive consensus-building process. Consultants are 
not considered superior moral decision makers, and the responsibility for the final 
moral judgment is shared between the involved parties. However, unlike the pure 
consensus approach, ethics facilitation maintains that there are moral boundaries 
within which the final decision must fall. Consultants help to ensure that the 
consensus decision does not fall outside of these moral boundaries. 
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 The discussion of which approach is most appropriate for HCEC can 
benefit from the SIM. A decision about which approach to adopt should be made 
with reference to our understanding of how moral judgments are actually made. 
The SIM is a model of this very process; it describes how people make moral 
judgments. How, then, does each of the three approaches to HCEC relate to the 
SIM? 
The Social Intuitionist Model and Healthcare Ethics Consultation 
The Authoritarian Approach 
The SIM challenges the appropriateness of the authoritarian approach, 
because the authoritarian approach is prone to a biased search for evidence 
(Figure 3). In the authoritarian approach, the consultant first gathers information 
about the situation, which elicits an initial intuition. This intuition leads to an initial 
judgment about what is right or wrong. The consultant then develops 
justifications to support their judgment using moral reasoning. While it is possible 
for the consultant to undergo this iterative process several times via Links 5 and 
6, these links are less likely to be used. 
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Figure 3. The authoritarian approach to HCEC. The consultant makes a moral judgment 
based on his or her own intuitions, and then reasons to find supporting arguments. The 
consultant can use links 5 and 6, but this is unlikely because their judgments likely go 
unquestioned. The interpersonal links in the model are ignored. 
 
Consultants do not access some timeless, universal moral truth through 
their ability to reason and use moral theories, as the TJM would suggest. When 
making individual moral judgments, consultants, just like everybody else, are 
likely to reason to support their own moral intuitions. Although people’s intuitions 
and judgments can change through self-reflection (Links 5 and 6), these links are 
thought to be less likely to be used. Therefore, removing the consultant from a 
social setting where their views can be challenged removes a safeguard against 
biased reasoning. HCEC approaches that allow a consultant to make conclusive 
moral judgments as an individual and do not place the consultant in a social 
setting where their initial judgments can be challenged (e.g., the authoritarian 
	   57	  
approach) increases the risk of biased moral judgments, and therefore should be 
rejected. 
The Pure Consensus Approach 
The SIM suggests that the pure consensus approach helps attenuate 
biased search for evidence because the approach appreciates the fact that 
morality is a social phenomenon (Figure 4). In the pure consensus approach, the 
consultant mediates a discussion between the involved parties about what ought 
to be done. The consultant facilitates discussion by representing the views of the 
involved parties to others, enabling the involved parties to communicate 
effectively, and attending to any communication barriers that might exist. In this 
way, the consultant catalyzes the links in the SIM. The consultant’s main task is 
facilitating interpersonal communication through Links 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 4. The pure consensus approach to HCEC. The consultant facilitates the 
interpersonal links 3 and 4, but does not contribute their own moral intuitions, judgments, 
and reasoning to the discussion. 
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Importantly, however, the pure consensus approach does not place the 
consultants themselves within the moral network. The consultant only catalyzes 
links within the network; he or she does not contribute their own intuitions, 
judgments or reasoning to the discussion. The fact that the consultant does not 
contribute his or her own intuitions, judgments, and reasoning to the discussion is 
what differentiates the pure consensus approach from the ethics facilitation 
approach, and will be discussed below. 
The Ethics Facilitation Approach 
The ethics facilitation approach also appreciates the fact that morality is a 
social phenomenon (Figure 5). Similar to the pure consensus approach, the 
consultant mediates the discussion by facilitating the interpersonal links in the 
SIM. However, unlike the pure consensus approach, the consultant is also 
included within the moral network. Consultants contribute their own intuitions, 
judgments and reasoning to the discussion.  
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Figure 5. The ethics facilitation approach to HCEC. The consultant not only facilitates the 
interpersonal links 3 and 4, but contributes their own moral intuitions, judgments, and 
reasoning to the discussion as well. 
 
The ASBH task for justifies including the consultant within the moral 
network based on the assumption that consultants possess HCEC expertise. The 
task force rejects the view that HCE consultants only have general knowledge 
and skills. Rather, the task force maintains that HCE consultants have specific 
HCEC expertise in the form of “specialized HCEC knowledge and skills 
competencies.”  2 Because consultants possess HCEC expertise, it is 
“appropriate for ethics consultants to share recommendations and expert 
opinions.” 2 It is therefore crucial to examine the sort of expertise HCEC may 
have. 
Healthcare Ethics Consultants and Expertise 
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In response to the revised Core Competencies for Healthcare Ethics 
Consultation, David Michael Adams has raised concern about the nature of 
HCEC expertise. 6 Adams addresses the counterintuitive claim that consultants 
possess ethics expertise allowing them to offer expert opinions, while still 
maintaining that the do not have moral authority. He writes: 
To insist that [consultants] possess ethics expertise and expert moral 
knowledge but not moral authority is on the face of it a puzzling claim, 
since the judgments of experts typically carry with them at least some 
kind of authority – otherwise there would be no reason for anyone to 
consult them. 6(p27) 
 
He goes on to point out that being an authority is an epistemic claim, reflecting 
recognition of an individual’s specialized knowledge and mastery of some 
domain. It is this possession of specialized knowledge and mastery that gives us 
reason to consult the expert on issues within their specialty. For example, it is 
because of a car mechanic’s knowledge about cars that he can speak with 
authority about what engine parts need replacing. Furthermore, it is because of a 
car mechanic’s knowledge we even ask him his opinion. What sorts of expertise 
do HCE consultants possess that justify asking them to opine on a case? 
Adams argues that the interpersonal facilitation skills characteristic of the 
pure consensus approach are a form of expertise. 6 He notes that mediating 
discussion requires the ability to communicate clearly, listen empathetically, 
isolate points of disagreement, and guide a respectful, open conversation about 
sensitive issues. He maintains that such process and interpersonal proficiencies 
“comprise an unquestionably important skill set, command of which can properly 
be called an expertise, conferring authority on the person who has mastered 
them.” 6(p27) 
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However, Adams argues that the expertise in interpersonal facilitation 
does not justify allowing consultants to give recommendations or expert opinions. 
He argues that these interpersonal skills have “no necessary connection with 
ethics, being applicable to a broad domain of contexts having nothing to do with 
conflicts over values or uncertainty about goals of medical treatment.” 6(p27) These 
skills do not give consultants authority to give recommendations or opinions on 
cases because these skills “do not call upon moral knowledge.” 6(p27) Therefore, 
Adams calls for careful consideration about “the forms ethics expertise and moral 
authority can take.” 6(p27) 
Based on Adams’ argument, the process and interpersonal skills held by 
HCE consultants are a form of expertise. Therefore, HCE consultants have 
authority at least in the structuring and facilitation of a discussion. Both the pure 
consensus approach and ethics facilitation approach give consultants authority in 
that regard. The question remains, however, of whether or not the consultant 
should offer recommendations or expert opinions. Does HCEC expertise extend 
beyond facilitating discussion? Should consultants be included in the moral 
network? 
At this point, I doubt that it can be said with certainty that competent HCE 
consultants possess skills extending beyond facilitating discussion. However, the 
SIM does provide a framework for hypothesizing why a HCE consultant’s opinion 
may be worth considering. Most critics of HCEC expertise offer the following 
argument: 7 
	   62	  
1. HCEC’s legitimacy depends on its ability to offer expertise in moral 
matters 
2. Expertise in moral matters is knowledge of a singular moral truth  
3. The claim that a consultant can offer knowledge of a singular moral 
truth based on professional training is absurd, false, or gravely immoral 
Therefore, 
4. The field is illegitimate 
This criticism makes critical assumptions about the nature of morality. It parallels 
the TJM, holding that morality is a kind of formal knowledge that approximates a 
timeless moral reality. What is right or good can be determined by the application 
of general rational decision-making procedures in the form of moral theories. 
Expertise, therefore, comes from superior reasoning about and application of 
moral theories. 
However, the SIM suggests that moral reasoning plays less of a primary 
role in making moral judgments than suggested by the TJM. Initial moral 
judgments are driven by moral intuitions about what is right or wrong, and moral 
reasoning is more likely to be used to develop arguments to support that moral 
judgment. Therefore, the notion that HCE consultant’s gain expertise from their 
superior knowledge of moral theories is false; moral reasoning is not the primary 
determinant of moral judgments, or at least not to the extent suggested by the 
TJM.  
Nonetheless, HCE consultants may still have moral expertise; we just 
shouldn’t expect to find it in their ability to apply moral theories.  The SIM 
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suggests that moral judgments are primarily driven by intuitions about what is 
right or wrong. Therefore, we should be discussing moral expertise in terms of 
moral intuitions, rather than moral reasoning.  
I doubt completely that HCE consultants are able to intuit the “better” 
course of action based on their moral intuitions or that their intuitions should be 
favored over those of others. However, it may be the case that HCE consultants 
have developed other skills related to moral intuitions; they may have a superior 
ability to “feel” what each party feels, or to sense nuanced differences between 
cases that others might not recognize. Through extensive clinical experience with 
morally challenging cases that are similar in some ways and different in others, 
may develop moral intuitions that pick up on subtle differences and gradations 
between cases.  
Just as an experienced physician or nurse may have a nuanced sense 
about a patients prognosis based on their training and clinical experience, it is 
reasonable to hypothesize that HCE consultants would have similar intuitions. 
These intuitions, while not providing definitive answers by any means, should not 
be discarded out of hand. Research on the moral intuitions of patients, providers, 
and consultants is necessary before drawing definitive conclusions about 
whether consultants possess more nuanced moral intuitions, and whether these 
intuitions are based on their clinical experience with morally challenging cases. 
Nonetheless, the hypothesis seems compelling to me, and consistent with the 
SIM and notions of expertise that exist elsewhere in healthcare.  
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HCEC expertise could also potentially relate to the automatization of Links 
5 and 6 in the SIM. As Fine argues in her critique of the SIM, there is evidence in 
automaticity research that conscious deliberative processes can be 
“automatized” over time after repeated intentional use. 36 It can therefore be 
reasonably hypothesized that clinical experience conducting consultations could 
“automatize” Links 5 and 6 in the SIM, making HCE consultants more likely to 
partake in deliberative reasoning than the layman.  
While these skills would not make consultants the moral authority (i.e., the 
authoritarian approach) because we all tend be biased in our search for 
evidence, it would give consultants some authority: enough authority to be able 
to offer an opinion that is worth considering. This would lend support to the ethics 
facilitation approach, where consultants are included in the moral network and 
are able to offer their expert opinions, rather than the pure consensus approach, 
where consultants only facilitate discussion and build consensus. 
Summary 
 In this chapter, I first summarized three approaches to HCEC: the 
authoritarian approach, the pure consensus approach, and the ethics facilitation 
approach. Second, I discussed each of these approaches in light of the SIM. The 
authoritarian approach should be rejected because it is prone to biased moral 
judgments. The pure consensus approach and ethics facilitation approaches both 
encourage discussion and seeking group consensus, which helps reduce the risk 
of biased moral judgments. However, the two approaches differ in where the 
consultant fits into the SIM. In the pure consensus approach, the consultant 
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solely facilitates the interpersonal links in the SIM, but refrains from expressing 
their own personal intuitions, judgments, and reasoning. In the ethics facilitation 
approach, the consultant is still responsible for facilitating the interpersonal links 
in the SIM, but is allowed to express their own personal intuitions, judgments, 
and reasoning: they are included within the moral network. 
 Finally, I hypothesized that if HCE consultants possess expertise 
warranting their inclusion in the moral network, it is likely to be related to moral 
intuitions. Through extensive clinical experience with morally challenging cases, 
consultants could develop moral intuitions that pick up on subtle differences and 
gradations between cases, offering insights that others would miss. Furthermore, 
it may be that Links 5 and 6 in the SIM could become “automatized” based 
repeated intentional use during training. Should these hypotheses prove correct, 
consultants should be able to offer expert opinions, as long as these 
recommendations are understood to be opinions and not authoritative judgments.  
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Conclusion 
The central idea of this paper, the idea that moral reasoning and moral 
theories are not as useful as I was taught in my first ethics class, began 
emerging halfway through my first semester of my bioethics masters program. 
Each class period focused on one particular topic in bioethics. During class, we 
would sit around the table and discuss that day’s topic in bioethics. Is abortion 
right or wrong? Should drug companies be able to pay people to be subjects in 
their research? Is our organ donation system fair for everyone? 
The results of these sessions surprised me, and were incredibly 
frustrating. We were all masters students. We all understood and could use the 
same theories. We were all smart enough to apply them to whatever topic we 
were discussing. Yet, even when we used the same moral theories, we still 
disagreed! It made no sense to me. Aren’t moral theories how people figure out 
what to do? If they are, why can’t we agree?! 
Around this same time, the 2012 presidential election and all its rhetoric 
was in full force. Democrats and Republicans were at odds with each other over 
what was best for the nation and who should lead it for the next 4 years. Yet 
nobody seemed to be able to change each other’s minds. How could people 
disagree so passionately about national debt, the proper scope of social 
services, and the war in the Middle East, yet still be really nice people who 
genuinely care about each other as soon as they stop talking about politics? It’s 
not because they aren’t smart, or because they aren’t thinking clearly. Both sides 
have sound arguments, yet neither side can sway the other. How can this be? 
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The potential answer came to me while shadowing the healthcare ethics 
consultation (HCEC) service at my university’s hospital that fall. The morning 
before the afternoon consult, I reviewed a short synopsis of the case and spent 
the next several hours on Google Scholar, reading up on the relevant moral 
theories. I thought about each of Beauchamp and Childress’ four biomedical 
principles, and what each principle suggested about the case. I felt confident in 
my understanding, and arrived at the consult with a pretty good idea about what 
ought to be done. 
But to my surprise, and in spite of my productive morning, not a single 
person at the consult, not one, based their judgments off of a moral theory. 
Nobody talked about what theory X suggests we should do, or why we should 
trust theory A over theory B in this circumstance. People talked about what the 
patient’s current status, the options going forward, and what each of those 
options meant for each of the parties involved medically, socially, spiritually, and 
otherwise. And as people talked, they came to understand where the other side 
was coming from, even if they didn’t necessarily agree on what should be done. 
Any discussion of moral theories was peripheral to the discussion about what 
actually should be done. 
I realized then that what was causing me such frustration related to my 
assumptions about how people figured out what ought to be done. My view of 
ethics was much like Bobby Fischer’s view of chess: “The object is to crush the 
opponent’s mind.” If you could use the right theory in the right way, you could 
force your opponent to crumble to their knees, confess their folly, and agree with 
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you. What distressed me was that my view of how people figured out what ought 
to be done was not what I was seeing in the real world. 
I realized that maybe it was my assumption about how people made moral 
judgments that was wrong, not the way that people applied moral theories. 
Maybe people don’t actually (or at least usually) use moral theories when they 
make their moral judgments. This idea opened a new door for me, and I was 
surprised to find that others too, both in psychology and in philosophy, had found 
support for this exact conclusion. 
Which brings us to this paper. I have argued first that HCEC is at a critical 
juncture in its history, and is taking its first steps toward professionalization. In 
order to advance down this path, several requirements must be met. First, 
consultants must identify how HCEC is best practiced. Second, HCEC educators 
must determine which knowledge and skill bases are necessary to implement an 
effective HCEC, so that they can best educate future and current consultants. I 
then argued that discussing these two requirements necessitates a discussion 
about the assumptions we make about the nature of morality. What is moral 
knowledge, and how is it obtained? How do people use moral knowledge to 
make moral judgments? Because these assumptions influence how HCE 
consultants practice, it is important to answer these questions as accurately as 
possible. 
I then presented two contrasting views of morality, which Margaret Urban 
Walker’s describes as the theoretical-juridical model (TJM) and the expressive-
collaborative model (ECM). The TJM views morality as an attempt to 
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approximate timeless, universal moral truths into rationally codifiable laws, 
procedures, or principles to guide individual behavior. Conversely, the ECM 
describes morality as a human social phenomenon that arises out of ongoing 
negotiations between people over responsibilities. Because the question of which 
model best represents the nature of moral knowledge is a descriptive question, I 
suggested that evidence from the sciences might contribute to this philosophical 
debate. 
I proceeded to present evidence that moral reasoning plays less of a role 
in our initial moral judgments than typically thought, and that emotional intuitions 
play more of a role than we would like to admit. Affective processing research 
suggests that preference need no inferences, or that people can make emotional 
evaluations of something without first understanding what that thing is like. 
Research on automaticity suggests that much, if not most, of our decisions 
happen automatically and unconsciously, unless we make conscious effort to 
control that decision. Neuroscience provides proof that emotional centers of the 
brain are involved in moral judgments, and in fact are recruited first. Cultural 
psychology suggests that we should strive for universalism without uniformity 
when describing morality, accounting for human variation without sacrificing our 
common humanity. Evolutionary psychology and primatology achieve this goal, 
both suggesting that morality is an adaptive process, developed over millions of 
years, in response to the challenges inherent to social life. Moral diversity 
represents different approaches to solving these common challenges. 
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I then presented a model of moral judgment that addresses these domains 
of research: the social intuitionist model (SIM). The first major claim of the SIM is 
that an individual’s initial moral judgments are caused by moral intuitions, 
followed by post hoc moral reasoning. The second major claim is that moral 
judgment is an ongoing social process. People in the same community create 
moral networks, where they express their judgments and use their moral 
reasoning in an ongoing attempt to justify their positions and persuade others to 
endorse their views.  
Returning to Margaret Urban Walker’s work on the nature, source, and 
justification of moral knowledge, I argued that the SIM suggests that the ECM 
more accurately describes the nature of morality then the TJM. The fact that an 
individual’s moral judgments are more often made based on intuition, and not by 
rationally applying moral theories, undermines a central tenant of the TJM. 
Furthermore, the ECM recognizes that morality is an ongoing social phenomenon 
arising out of the challenges inherent to social life.  
Finally, I first summarized three commonly discussed approaches to 
HCEC: 1) the authoritarian approach, 2) the pure consensus approach, and 3) 
the ethics facilitation approach. After describing these three approaches, I 
discussed each approach in light of the SIM. The authoritarian approach should 
be rejected because it is prone to biased moral judgments. Both the pure 
consensus approach and ethics facilitation approaches are compatible with the 
SIM because they recognize the interpersonal nature of moral judgments, and 
help reduce the risk of biased moral judgments. However, the two approaches 
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differ in where the consultant fits into the SIM. In the pure consensus approach, 
the consultant solely facilitates the interpersonal links in the SIM, but refrains 
from expressing their own personal intuitions, judgments, and reasoning. In the 
ethics facilitation approach, the consultant is still responsible for facilitating the 
interpersonal links in the SIM, but is allowed to express their own personal 
intuitions, judgments, and reasoning: they are included within the moral network. 
 I finish by hypothesizing that if HCE consultants possess expertise 
warranting their inclusion in the moral network, it is likely to be related to moral 
intuitions, rather than a better ability to apply moral theories. Through extensive 
clinical experience with morally challenging cases, consultants could develop 
moral intuitions that pick up on subtle differences and gradations between cases, 
offering insights that others would miss. Additionally, the deliberative reasoning 
links in the SIM could become “automatized” through repeated intentional use. If 
these hypotheses prove correct, consultants should be able to offer expert 
opinions, as long as these recommendations are understood to be opinions and 
not authoritative judgments. 
The culmination of this paper point to an education program for HCE 
consultants heavily focused on clinical experience. The practical skills necessary 
to create an environment where the interpersonal links in the SIM function 
seamlessly takes practice, and the only way to learn these skills is to see them 
implemented and to practice them repeatedly. Furthermore, if it were true that 
HCE consultants can develop more sensitive moral intuitions, the ability to 
empathize through their experience with morally challenging cases, or 
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automatize the deliberative reasoning links in the SIM, clinical experience would 
be of even greater importance for education future consultants. 
Finally, I wholeheartedly recommend educating future HCE consultants 
about moral philosophy and moral theories, as long as that education is done 
with the SIM in mind. Moral theories, and the ability to reason with them, do not 
offer unique access to some timeless moral truth. Nonetheless, moral theories 
are clear manifestations of a culture’s history and represent ideas that are central 
to a culture’s moral fabric. While theories of justice or autonomy may not tap into 
some abstract moral truth, these theories do demonstrate recognize that these 
ideas are highly valued in Western society. The principle of autonomy is not the 
cause of our cultural ideals of individualism and independence. In fact it is quite 
the opposite: the principle of autonomy arises out of our ideals of individualism 
and independence. HCE consultants should therefore of course learn about 
moral theories and principles, but with the understanding that those theories 
arise out of the social and cultural movements that lead to their development, 
rather than through abstract logical deduction that is often purported to undergird 
them.  
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